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Legislative Delegation and Two Conceptions of the 
Legislative Power 
ROBERT C. SARVIS* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The current federal government, with its burgeoning administrative 
agencies, does not embody what most Americans would recognize as the 
constitutional doctrine of separation of powers.  This is, in part, due to the 
Congress’s frequent practice of delegating legislative powers to the execu-
tive branch, i.e., giving administrative agencies the power to promulgate 
rules regulating private behavior and having the force of law.  Legislative 
delegation has been the subject of academic, legal, and political wrangling 
since the early congresses and clearly calls into question whether modern 
practice adheres to constitutional norms. This article discusses legislative 
delegation in terms of some core ideas that informed the writing and ratifi-
cation of the Constitution, and then look at debates on legislative delega-
tion from the early republic, the Progressive era, and modern times.  Ulti-
mately, this article argues that the nondelegation doctrine – that legislative 
power cannot be delegated to the executive consistently with the Constitu-
tion – should be viewed as an important protector of constitutional values 
whose judicial enforcement is both desirable and practicable.  In Part II, I 
discuss how the change in the conception of law and legislative power over 
the eighteenth century ought to influence how one appraises the propriety 
of legislative delegation.  In Part III, I consider important debates over 
delegation occurring at critical moments in the history of delegation.  In-
stead of focusing on the relatively familiar historical narrative of Supreme 
Court cases, I concentrate on the unchanging themes underlying arguments 
about delegation.  In Part IV, I consider the main point of contention in 
modern discussions of delegation, namely judicial review, and evaluate 
assertions regarding its practicability and clarity. 
  
 *  Robert C. Sarvis is a recent graduate of the New York University School of Law.  He currently 
serves as a judicial law clerk for the Honorable E. Grady Jolly of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit. 
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II. CONCEPTIONS OF LAW AND THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE 
A. Law as Restraint of Princes 
1. Divided Power – Legislative Power as Defense 
The idea that government power should somehow be divided in order 
to prevent its abuse is very old.  Various versions of the idea have appeared 
going back to classical antiquity.1  How successive thinkers fashioned from 
older models new paradigms for dividing power indicates the changing 
perceptions regarding the most worrisome abuses of power.  The Glorious 
Revolution was a profoundly important event in Anglo-American history, 
and the philosophy of the Glorious Revolution, as expressed by the writ-
ings of various English commentators of the era, proved highly influential 
on American political philosophy up through the American Revolution.  
The Glorious Revolution is therefore a fine place to begin an exploration 
into how conceptions of law and legislative power impinge on an under-
standing of the separation of powers doctrine and legislative delegation. 
To English writers of the time, the most important theme in English le-
gal history was the establishment of law constraining the monarch.  The 
divine right of kings had justified the crown’s claim of prerogative, which 
amounted to arbitrary and unchecked discretionary power.  Law was its 
opposite, in the sense that it was known, fixed, and applicable to all – not 
even the king was “above” the law.  Magna Carta, but one example, was 
celebrated as the first major, lasting, written charter establishing limits to 
the king’s power; for example, it provides that: “No freeman shall be 
taken, or imprisoned, or disseized, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any way 
harmed – nor will [the King] go upon or send upon him – save by the law-
ful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.”2  The struggles for 
judicial independence, the rise of the common law courts and the demise of 
the Star Chamber, the rise of Parliament as a check on the king’s power to 
levy taxes at will, etc., all illustrate the same notion that the fundamental 
purpose of law was to constrain the king.  The Glorious Revolution was the 
capstone to this historical edifice, and greatly influenced American think-
ing, especially with respect to the separation of powers doctrine. 
Locke’s Second Treatise of Government was written in the years prior 
to the Glorious Revolution and attempted to justify the philosophy of Par-
liamentary supremacy.  Locke posited three powers, a legislative, an ex-
  
 1. See e.g. T. Gilby, Principality and Polity 292 (Longmans 1958); M.J.C. Vile, Constitutionalism 
and Separation of Powers (2d ed., Liberty Fund 1998); Kurt von Fritz, The Theory of the Mixed Consti-
tution in Antiquity (Arno Press 1975). 
 2. Magna Carta cl. 39 (1215). 
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ecutive, and a federative.  The first two are essentially those we recognize 
by the same names today; the last we might today describe as the power to 
conduct foreign affairs.  The legislative power was the power to restrain 
the king by making law.  Law received its legitimacy by the consent of the 
people, and the body representing the people was Parliament.  English lib-
erty, which meant government under the rule of law, meant the supremacy 
of law over the king and a fortiori the supremacy of Parliament over the 
king.  Parliament, as the representative body representing the people, could 
constrain the king’s power of prerogative.3 
For English thinkers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the 
theoretical argument for division of power was predicated on the historical 
depredations of an unchecked king wielding his power of discretion.  Leg-
islative power and legislative supremacy were instruments of defense, pro-
tecting the people against arbitrary rule of the executive.  After the Glori-
ous Revolution, the king, in theory, acted only with the ongoing consent of 
Parliament. 
Yet Parliament was not empowered to make new law in the modern 
sense.  The legislative power was not understood as the power to promul-
gate any set of rules regulating private activity in order to refashion soci-
ety; it was the power to curb the arbitrariness of royal administration in 
order that it better comport with established notions of justice.4  A change 
in the meaning of Parliamentary supremacy was, in fact, a source of the 
dispute that matured into the American Revolutionary controversy, as Eng-
lish and American conceptions of legislative supremacy and the rights of 
Englishmen diverged considerably by the mid-1760s.5 
2. Legislative Delegation as Claim of Supremacy 
The concept of legislative power, of course, preceded the Glorious 
Revolution.  In previous centuries, Parliament had used the concept in or-
der to assert itself as the principal vessel in which legislative power re-
sided.  In these contexts, the language of legislative delegation was used to 
assert that regulatory and rulemaking power exercised by the king derived 
from Parliament’s power of giving consent. 
In this regard, Cecil Carr’s early twentieth century historical account of 
the English practice of legislative delegation points to Parliamentary Acts 
  
 3. John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, in Ernest Barker, Social Contract ch. XI-XII 
(Oxford U. Press 1947); Vile, supra n. 1, at 64-70.   
 4. See Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings 209 (Vintage Books 1997); Vile, supra n. 1, at 70; 
Gordon S. Wood, The creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 262-65 (U.N.C. Press 1998). 
 5. Bernard Bailyn, Ideological Origins of the American Revolution Ch. V (Belknap Press of Har-
vard U. Press 1992). 
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dating as far back as the reign of Henry VIII.  These Acts are significant 
not so much as precedent for delegation or guideposts for what should be 
accepted practice today, but rather as an illustration of the fact that legisla-
tive delegation must be viewed in the context of essential contests over 
power.  The Statute of Proclamations in 1539, for example, stated that 
proclamations of the King in Council were to have the validity of Acts of 
Parliament.6  Clearly, Parliament was distinguishing between statutory law 
and royal proclamations, and assuming the superior legitimacy of the for-
mer.7 
The purpose of this is evident given the importance of precedent in 
English constitutional argument.8  As Carr notes, one can view this ancient 
example of delegation as having a dual nature – the Act “looks like the 
concession to the Crown by Parliament of unlimited legislative authority.  
Yet it can also be looked upon as a surrender by the Crown of the old 
unlimited prerogative power.”9  That is, it can be viewed as a claim of Par-
liamentary supremacy, that the king acts only with the imprimatur of Par-
liament.  Recognizing this duality is relevant to modern debates because it 
shows how the propriety of delegation depends on the existing conception 
of the legislative power in the constitutional scheme.  In the aforemen-
tioned early times, delegation was a fiction that recognized the fact of 
kingly power while rejecting the justification of kingly prerogative.  After 
the death of Henry VIII, the Statute of Proclamations was repealed; the 
ensuing decades witnessed a retrenchment of prerogative, as noted in the 
Petition for Redress of Grievances of 1610: “It is apparent . . . that procla-
mations have been of late years much more frequent than heretofore . . . 
.”10  The contest over legislative supremacy, of course, would not end until 
1688. 
After the Glorious Revolution, delegation continued as Parliament 
came to appreciate both its convenience and its necessity amidst wars, dis-
ease outbreaks, and social changes.11  But acceptance of legislative su-
premacy meant that exercises of delegation were viewed differently from 
  
 6. Statute of Proclamations, 31 Hen. 8, ch. 8 (Eng.); see also Cecil T. Carr, Delegated Legislation 
50 (Cambridge U. Press 1921); David C. Elliot, The Origins of Statutes: Extracts from various sources 
about the origins of Statute Law, http://www.davidelliott.ca/papers/origins.htm (Sept. 1989); Joaquin 
Varela Suanzes, Sovereignty in British Legal Doctrine, http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/ 
v6n3/suanzes63nf.html (accessed May 22, 2006).  Interestingly, the Act also included what would 
today be called a notice requirement: within fourteen days, sheriffs and other officers were to read and 
post, in towns and villages, the substance of the king’s proclamation. 
 7. See Carr, supra n. 6, at 22-23 (discussing, generally, statutes versus proclamations). 
 8. See John Phillip Reid, Constitutional History of the American Revolution 11-13 (U. of Wis. 
Press 1995) (discussing the importance of precedent in constitutional argument). 
 9. See Carr, supra n. 6, at 52. 
 10. See id. at 53. 
 11. See id. at 54-55. 
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those of eras past.  Even though a small and shifting minority periodically 
denounced acts of legislative delegation, English commentators like Carr 
could remain confident in the safety of the people’s liberty, blithely point-
ing out the irony in the fact that Parliament reigned in the discretion of the 
king only to establish discretion in the administrative agency.  Though 
“[t]he idea that . . . any branch of the executive . . . has power to prescribe 
or alter the law . . . is out of harmony with the principles of our constitu-
tion,” it is not a matter of concern because executive power to make rules 
“derive[s] . . . from the statute which creates the power and not from the 
executive body [itself].”12  Carr was writing in early twentieth century 
England.  One wonders if he would be so sanguine today, when govern-
ment is vastly different from what it was then. 
3. Defense and the Constitution 
The conception of legislative power as a restraint on the executive can 
be seen in the Constitution, which, for example, grants to Congress “the 
power to make rules for the government.”13  Explicitly placing in the legis-
lature the power to make rules regulating government action affirms the 
fundamental principle of the Glorious Revolution, that the executive is 
subject to constraint by the legislature.  Such a power is a defensive one, 
for regulating the executive is essentially a responsive action.  At least in 
the first instance, most rulemaking regulating the executive takes place 
internally within the executive department.  The head of the executive, the 
President, can exercise discretion in creating rules for his subordinates.  
Legislated rules regulating the executive department are only necessary in 
response to abusive or arbitrary action. 
In this context, then, delegation of that specific enumerated power ap-
proximates to some extent the division of powers created by the Glorious 
Revolution.  The legislature sits in wait of excess; the executive acts with a 
presumption of legitimacy.  The only difference is that an affirmative legis-
lative act requiring execution is required in the first place in order to in-
stantiate executive action potentially requiring regulation. 
Most examples of legislative delegation in the early years of the repub-
lic are delegations of this power to regulate the executive.14  Not surpris-
ingly, then, delegating language was somewhat common in the early con-
gresses, which established various cabinet departments and administrative 
bodies.  The First Congress passed statutes giving cabinet members author-
  
 12. See id. at 55. 
 13. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.   
 14. John P. Comer, Legislative Functions of National Administrative Authorities 52-55 (Columbia 
U. Press 1927). 
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ity to “prescribe rules and regulations” for their respective departments;15 
empowering the President to spell out and carry out the details for erecting 
a lighthouse at the mouth of the Chesapeake Bay;16 directing the President 
to continue payments established under the Articles of Confederation to 
wounded veterans of the Revolutionary War “under such regulations as the 
President of the United States may direct”;17 and allowing the President to 
establish “fit and proper regulations for estimating duties on [imported] 
goods, wares, and merchandise.”18 
Even where delegations varied from this sort in the early years of the 
republic, they were usually not delegations of power to regulate private 
domestic activity, but rather, things like contingent tariffs, discussed be-
low, and licensing of trade with the Indian tribes.19  Still, delegation could 
prove problematic and difficult to contain.  Comer writes that “it is a fact 
that this very provision [for making internal rules and regulations] has 
served as a basis for a great deal of legislation framed in the absence of 
specific delegations.”20  This suggests the importance of identifying the 
contexts in which delegation is appropriate and of limiting delegation to 
those contexts. 
B. Law as Command of the Sovereign 
1. Law and Legislation 
The “modern” conception of the legislative power espouses a positivist 
understanding of law, according to which there is an acknowledged source 
of power, the sovereign, and law is the command of the sovereign.21  By 
supposition, the sovereign cannot be bound, and what the sovereign estab-
lishes as law must be recognized as such and obeyed.22 
The Glorious Revolution established Parliament’s supremacy to the 
king, but only gradually was Parliamentary supremacy understood in the 
absolute terms of Hobbesian sovereignty.  By the second half of the eight-
  
 15. Id. at 52. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Gary Lawson, Federal Administrative Law 51 (West Publg. Co. 1998). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Variations on positivism are unimportant here.  Whether the essential concept is the sovereign 
command or the rule of recognition or something else, what matters is that whatever is posited by the 
proper person or procedure is accepted as law. 
 22. The root of the word “legislation” encapsulates the legislative power inhering in the positivist’s 
sovereign: the bringing forth of law. 
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eenth century, however, numerous English commentators could write of 
the “uncontrollable” power of Parliament.23  For example,  
[i]n the year of the Stamp Act . . . Blackstone . . . wrote in his 
Commentaries that ‘there is and must be in all [forms of govern-
ment] a supreme, irresistible, absolute, uncontrolled authority, in 
which the jura summi imperii, or the rights of sovereignty reside,’ 
and that in England this ‘sovereignty of the British constitution’ 
was lodged in Parliament . . . whose actions ‘no power on earth 
can undo.’24 
When Parliament began enacting new measures to regulate colonial af-
fairs, Americans became aware of this changed understanding of Parlia-
mentary supremacy.  When Parliament nakedly declared its sovereignty 
over the colonies, in the Declaratory Act of 1766, Americans appreciated 
its import, but the defensive view of legislative power was still foremost in 
the minds of the Americans.  This is not surprising given that the suprem-
acy of the colonial assemblies was still disputed, and the royal colonial 
governors still exercised powers that had died out in England, like dissolv-
ing assemblies, suspending the application of laws, and removing judges at 
pleasure.25  The rhetoric and philosophy of the Glorious Revolution there-
fore understandably colored the thinking of Americans during the 1760s 
and 1770s.26 
Accepting Parliamentary jurisdiction without representation was prob-
lematic precisely because it was representation that breathed meaning into 
the legislature’s ability to defend against executive encroachment.  Consent 
through representation provided the necessary link between sovereignty 
and legislative power, and so Americans foresaw that Parliamentary sover-
eignty over the American colonies, in the absence of representation in Par-
liament, meant the loss of a defensive safeguard against executive arbi-
trariness.  Thus, the Revolutionary theory that developed crystallized 
around the notion that sovereignty lay in the people, and that the legislative 
body only legislated by delegation from the people.27 
In the view of the Americans, then, the Revolutionary struggle was a 
claim of the rights of Englishmen that were won in 1688.  The Americans 
had not yet comprehended how legislative supremacy would produce a 
different type of legislature, or how, to paraphrase Rakove, “once lawmak-
ing became the essential activity of [a legislature], [it would] become eas-
  
 23. Wood, supra n. 4, at 265.  
 24. Bailyn, supra n. 5, at 202. 
 25. Rakove, supra n. 4, at 212. 
 26. See generally The Declaration of Independence (1776); Reid, supra n. 8. 
 27. See Bailyn, supra n. 5, at ch. V. 
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ier to abandon the traditional understanding which regarded law as a re-
straint on the capacity of the [executive] to act arbitrarily, and to accept in 
its place the modern notion which treat[s] law simply as the command of 
the . . . sovereign.”28 
2. State and Federal Constitutions – The Ambiguous Legislative Power 
Americans at the time of the Revolution viewed the legislature as the 
proper source of law, but still viewed law as a defensive shield against the 
executive, even as legislative supremacy was already producing the mod-
ern conception of law, according to which law could be utilized where 
desired as an affirmative tool in economic and social development, organi-
zation, and control.  In sum, there was an underlying ambiguity regarding 
the legislative power that, especially for constitution-making, was unap-
preciated in 1776 but better (if incompletely) sensed by 1787.  As a result, 
one can see a pronounced difference between the design of the state consti-
tutions in 1776 and the eventual structure of the federal Constitution in 
1787.  More specifically, one can see a major difference in the conception 
of separation of powers informing constitutional theory. 
a. Revolutionary Constitutional Experience – The Improvident Legis-
lature, the Impetuous Vortex 
Once the colonies had declared their independence from Britain, the 
newly independent states needed to institute new governments.  The theory 
of popular sovereignty meant not only that the new governments had to be 
created and legitimated by the freely given consent of the people, but also 
that those governments had to enshrine the supremacy of the representative 
legislatures over the executive.  As a result, virtually all the state constitu-
tions created dominant legislatures.  Most new constitutions had the gover-
nor elected by the legislature and reduced the executive radically by elimi-
nating its role in legislation and stripping it “of most of the badges of 
domination, called prerogatives,” like controlling the meeting of the legis-
lature, creating courts, levying taxes, and making war.  No state constitu-
tion retained the executive’s sole appointment power, instead forcing the 
executive to at least share the power with the legislature if not cede it en-
tirely.  In sum, the governors had been rendered “mere ciphers, almost 
totally dependent on the legislatures.”29 
  
 28. Rakove, supra n. 4, at 211. 
 29. Wood, supra n. 4, at 407. 
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In the decade after the establishment of governments under dominant 
legislatures, problems emerged, and the source was the legislatures them-
selves: 
An excess of power in the people was leading not simply to licen-
tiousness but to a new kind of tyranny, not by the traditional rules, 
but by the people themselves . . . .  It was too much government, 
not the lack of it, that was so frightening to some . . . .  [T]he peo-
ple appeared more capable of oppression . . . .  The people’s will as 
expressed in their representative legislatures and so much trusted 
throughout the colonial period suddenly seemed capricious and ar-
bitrary.  It was not surprising now for good Whigs to declare that 
“a popular assembly not governed by fundamental laws . . . will 
commit more excess than an arbitrary monarch.”30 
In the eyes of republican Whigs, the legislatures were corrupting the law.  
Two conceptions of law were in direct conflict, and legislative supremacy 
implicitly embraced, or at least furthered, the positivist conception, which 
was not yet acknowledged or accepted. 
As James Madison famously put it, the legislature was “drawing all 
power into its impetuous vortex,”31 and the rule of law was suffering 
thereby.  An example typifying the change in the meaning of legislative 
power was the change in the meaning of “grievances.”  As Wood notes, 
“grievances” had originally meant complaints regarding “excesses . . . of 
the executive power . . . [that] could not be remedied without the interposi-
tion of the people’s representatives.  In America, however, grievances had 
become simply the hardships which will always arise from the operation of 
general laws.”32 
The most explicit statement of the problems created by the legislative 
power came from James Wilson, who traced the problems to America’s 
naïve trust in legislative supremacy.  “[P]rejudices against the Executive . . 
. resulted from a misapplication of the adage that the parliament was the 
palladium of liberty,” but in the American states, where executives were 
constitutionally eviscerated and legislatures were dominant, “legislature 
and tyranny . . . were more properly associated.”33  Though some argued 
that imperfections in representation had rendered legislatures detached 
from the people, the growing, and more troubling, realization was that the 
  
 30. Wood, supra n. 4, at 404-05. 
 31. The Federalist No. 48, 256-57 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 
2001).   
 32. See Wood, supra n. 4, at 408 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 33. See id. at 409. 
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problem was with republican theory itself.  As usual, it was Madison who 
expressed this new understanding most profoundly and succinctly.   
Wherever the real power in a Government lies, there is the danger 
of oppression.  In our Governments the real power lies in the ma-
jority of the Community, and the invasion of private rights is 
chiefly to be apprehended . . . from acts in which the Government 
is the mere instrument of the major number of the constituents.34 
One can see this ambivalence about the legislative power in the writ-
ings of numerous individuals throughout the era.  Thomas Jefferson, who 
believed strongly in popular self-governance, who perhaps more than any-
one else distrusted the ancient wisdom of the common law and believed in 
the living generation’s moral right to change the law as it saw fit, neverthe-
less noted that “[o]ne hundred and seventy-three despots would surely be 
as oppressive as one.”35 
b. Federal Constitutional Experiment – Legislative Power Confined 
The experience under the state constitutions encouraged the Founding 
generation to recognize the implicit reconception of law and legislative 
power that was taking place.  In designing a replacement for the Articles of 
Confederation, the Founders understood that federal law would be mostly 
legislated, and their awareness of the perils of legislation is palpable in the 
Constitution.  Various means of constraining the legislature appear.  The 
reliance on enumeration is the foremost constraint and directly shows the 
Founders’ perception of the threat to liberty that the legislature repre-
sented.  The Tenth Amendment made explicit what enumeration implied, 
that Congress had no powers except those delegated.  All other matters not 
delegated to coordinate branches were to be resolved at the state level, 
even the mischief of plenary state legislatures, which could be cabined by 
state constitutional means. 
Other constitutional features are equally telling and impact the discus-
sion of delegation.  Most important here is that the Founders reconsidered 
the wisdom of legislative dominance.  The Constitution that emerged put 
the legislative, executive, and judicial branches on equal footing, with each 
branch acting as a check on the others.  Moreover, because the legislature, 
as the branch most closely connected to the people, would naturally gain 
the upper hand in constitutional conflicts, the Constitution embodied struc-
  
 34. Id. at 410 (quoting Madison to Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788)). 
 35. The Federalist No. 48, supra n. 31, at 257 (James Madison) (quoting Thomas Jefferson, Notes 
on the State of Virginia (1781-1785)).   
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tural inhibitions of the legislature.  An important aspect of this was bicam-
eralism.  One house would retain close sympathy with the people – a ne-
cessity of a republican legislature – but splitting the legislative power by 
adding a second chamber would impede its exercise.  This was true not 
only on account of the mere split itself, but also because the weaker cham-
ber, the Senate, would have split allegiances, its interests aligned, in the 
case of treaty ratification and appointment of judges and cabinet members, 
with the weaker of the political branches, the executive.36 
i. Bicameralism and the Mixed Constitution 
The model for bicameralism (and separation of powers more broadly) 
was England’s Parliament and the theory of the mixed constitution.  Mixed 
constitutionalism, like separation of powers, divides power in order to con-
strain it.  But whereas separation of powers divides power based on type 
and function, mixed constitutionalism (on an idealized view) divides power 
by utilizing different existing groupings of people to create multiple bod-
ies, the consent of all of which is required to constitute legitimate govern-
ment action.  In England, the king, the nobles, and the commoners were 
respectively institutionalized in the crown, the House of Lords, and the 
House of Commons, sometimes romanticized as power, wisdom, and vir-
tue, respectively; or the one, the few, and the many. 
The mixed constitution of England, based on hereditary social classes, 
was antithetical to the American ethic that “all men are created equal.”  
Instead, the bicameral American Congress, together with presentment to 
the president, splices political equality and democratic elections into mixed 
constitutionalism by splitting the legislative branch into two separate 
chambers, both ultimately deriving their authority from the people, yet 
effecting representation in distinct ways that recognize and utilize different 
existing groupings.  The House of Representatives keeps closer to the de-
mocratic ideal of representation by focusing on individuals according to 
the one-man-one-vote principle, thereby emphasizing sympathy between 
constituents and representatives via direct election, short (two-year) terms, 
and election districts of (approximately) equal (and, for as long as was 
practicable, small) population.  The Senate purports to represent all citizens 
as well, but in a very different sense.  It strays from the popular democratic 
representational scheme dramatically by focusing instead on the interests 
of citizens in maintaining some amount of political sovereignty at the state 
level.  It therefore relies on the existing grouping of people into their sepa-
rate polities (the several states), has longer (six-year) terms, and originally 
  
 36. See The Federalist No. 51, supra n. 31 (James Madison). 
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achieved election via state legislative election, thus giving the state gov-
ernments representation as such. 
The Founders believed in democracy and the capacity of the people for 
self-government, yet they also feared both temporary passions and legisla-
tion for private gain rather than public good.  They saw the Senate’s longer 
terms, older age requirement, and indirect method of election as inhibiting 
temporary passions from affecting public policy.37  And they believed the 
differences in electoral make-up and electoral method placed the chambers 
of Congress on different foundations that would thereby reduce the likeli-
hood of factious capture of the legislature.38  That Senators had different 
constituencies from Representatives, at least in the first instance, meant 
greater difficulty for special interests in controlling both houses of the leg-
islature and the legislation that got passed.39  Even if the Senate failed to 
become a more deliberative, wiser body than the House, the differences in 
electoral make-up were still of value. 
Bicameralism is best viewed, therefore, as an instrument that helps en-
sure that legislation is truly in the public interest.  By requiring a majority 
in each house of a multi-chamber legislature, where each house is differ-
ently elected by a different division of the people, bicameralism requires 
legislation to have truly broad appeal beyond what a simple numerical ma-
jority could effect in a direct democracy.  It is therefore similar in aim to 
super-majoritarian voting systems, but still adheres in some sense to the 
majoritarian premise. 
The importance of this view of bicameralism can be better understood 
by allusion to a theory of law that views legislation as an inherently sus-
pect source of law.  Consider, therefore, Hayek’s view of law and legisla-
tion and John O. McGinnis’s discussion of its relation to super-
majoritarianism.40  Hayek saw society as a “spontaneous order” requiring 
no centralized decision-making authority but exhibiting localized adher-
ence to general rules of behavior.  The bulk of these rules make up cus-
tomary practices and even customary law, and some of this customary law 
becomes ossified into official state-enforced law, such as the common law.  
The important thesis here is that the common law, through case-by-case 
  
 37. See e.g. The Federalist No. 62, supra n. 31 (James Madison). 
 38. See e.g. id.  This was a point of contention, but as Madison makes clear, it was understood as a 
theoretical matter. 
 39. See e.g. Jonathan Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpre-
tation: An Interest Group Model, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 223, 247-49 (1986); Todd J. Zywicki, Beyond the 
Shell and Husk of History: The History of the Seventeenth Amendment and Its Implications for Current 
Reform Proposals, 45 Clev. St. L. Rev. 165, 176-79 (1997). 
 40. F.A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty 94-144 (U. of Chi. Press 1973); John O. McGinnis, 
Reviving Tocqueville’s America: The Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 Cal.  
L. Rev. 485 (2002). 
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adjudication and jury participation, in theory, or ideally, tracks the organi-
cally grown customary law.  If true, then such law has greater legitimacy 
because custom is, by definition, broadly adhered to and accepted as a mat-
ter of fact; its ossification into state-sanctioned law will likely have broad 
support within the society.  Moreover, because custom evolves, so too, in 
theory, should the common law.  Legislation, however, was, for Hayek, 
very different, in that it was a highly centralized method of creating new 
rules governing individual behavior; and it guarantees no more than major-
ity support.  For a variety of reasons stemming from this fact, legislation is 
therefore arguably less credible a source of law in that the influences that 
create it are less likely to be those that espouse or embody values or norms 
held broadly by the people as a whole.  This is true to some extent even in 
a localized population, but it is especially true in a large, pluralistic society. 
McGinnis argues that the legitimacy problem of centrally planned legal 
rules is sufficient to explain supermajority voting requirements in various 
situations; supermajorities create a reasonable check on attempts to create 
or impose social norms on the whole of society.  Since the Founders be-
lieved in the power of the majority to control the law, they sought in bi-
cameralism a way to achieve the aims of super-majoritarianism without 
jettisoning, for ordinary legislation, majority voting rules.  It does so in a 
subtle and complicated – and imperfect – way.41 
C. Delegation – Harmless Convenience, Modern Necessity, or Dangerous 
Anachronism? 
The experience of the Founding generation led them to embrace two 
principles that gradually came to pose a potential conflict – popular sover-
eignty and limited government.  The former idea worked to secure the lat-
ter while law was conceived as a constraint on executive discretion and 
sovereignty meant something closer to supremacy or superior legitimacy.  
Popular sovereignty was a way of inhibiting a legislature’s claim over peo-
ple who lacked the ability to voice consent through representation.  But 
once sovereignty became Hobbesian and the positivist conception of law 
became the implicit predicate of legislative enactments, popular sover-
eignty potentially conflicted with limited government insofar as the legisla-
ture purported to voice the will of the sovereign people, for how could law 
established by the sovereign be limited? 
  
 41. One way in which the impediments to legislative action might operate imperfectly is by imped-
ing equally different species of legislation.  There might be good arguments for treating differently 
statutes limiting the executive, those establishing new general rules of private conduct, those codifying 
common law rules, and those correcting mischiefs in the common law. 
File: Sarvis - 4 Pierce L. Rev. 317 (revised) Created on:  6/18/2006 9:03:00 PM Last Printed: 6/18/2006 9:13:00 PM 
330 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 4, No. 2 
The development of constraints on the legislature as a reaction to the 
legislative excesses under the state constitutions intimates the relative 
worth of the two ideas.  The Constitution was written to create a limited 
government; sovereignty was a conceptual abstraction that was difficult to 
cast off, and popular sovereignty in particular was more a response to 
counter claims of legislative sovereignty than it was a predicate to a coher-
ent theory of government.  Therefore, given that limitations of legislative 
power were of inherent importance to the Constitution, it is appropriate to 
adhere to structural constraints on the legislative power, even where based 
on formal distinctions like that between legislative and executive power.  
This is ever more true today, where legislation almost entirely embraces 
the modern conception of the legislative power, and is used as an engine of 
social change and economic regulation.  As we shall see, in the decades 
surrounding the turn of the twentieth century, the nature of the powers 
delegated to the executive changed in character, so that, with the rise of the 
administrative state, delegations increasingly empowered the executive to 
establish rules of private behavior rather than merely to exercise discretion 
in executing the laws.  Yet the Supreme Court applied a line of precedent 
sanctioning delegations in the latter context to uphold delegations in the 
private behavior-regulating, administrative rulemaking context.  This was a 
mistake.  As a general matter, new rules regulating private activity and 
having the force of law ought to pass through Congress. 
Arguments in favor of the constitutionality of delegation have at their 
base the idea that delegation is unproblematic because, if the delegated 
power is improperly used, Congress can always undelegate.  This founda-
tional argument is a return to the view of the legislative power that pre-
dominated in the years immediately following the Glorious Revolution – 
the legislative power as a defensive mechanism.  The executive, given the 
speed and energy with which it can get things done, gets first crack at gov-
ernance, and only when its efforts run afoul should the legislature intervene 
to protect the people.  On this view, the American Constitution primarily 
does two important things regarding the legislative power (aside from lim-
iting its powers by enumeration).  First, as the Revolutionary state constitu-
tions did, it vests certain prerogative-like powers in Congress rather than 
the president, thereby establishing in writing what the Glorious Revolution 
established in the minds of Englishmen, that the government receives its 
legitimacy from the ongoing consent of the governed as exhibited through 
their representatives.  Second, because the legislative power originally 
resides in Congress, it predicates executive action in the domestic sphere 
on congressional delegation, thus making consent an explicit pre-condition 
to executive action, rather than an assumed fact that is only meaningful 
when taken away. 
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While law was conceived as the opposite of discretion, this view may 
have been unremarkable.  But once law became a tool of social organiza-
tion, once law became nothing other than the command of the sovereign, 
the defensive view of Congress implicit in these pro-delegation arguments 
became suspect. 
Arguments against delegation accept modern legislative power and the 
positivist view that creation of new law is its quintessence.  Because of the 
enormous influence and coercive nature of law and the legal apparatus, the 
ability to create law out of whole cloth is an awesome power.  The defen-
sive view of the legislative power cannot be wedded to the positivist un-
derstanding of law as the command of the sovereign while still maintaining 
adherence to constitutional norms.  The power to make rules governing 
private individuals ought to be kept in the hands of the legislature, where it 
was conscientiously placed, because the very design of the legislature is 
instrumental in limiting the bounds of legislation.  The importance of sepa-
rating the powers of government and reducing the legislature through enu-
meration, bicameralism, and other mechanisms militates against removing 
the law-making power to agencies administered by the executive depart-
ment.  The fact that the Founders were aware of the problems created by a 
legislature exercising a modern legislative power means that constitutional 
impediments to the exercise of that power should be taken seriously, in-
cluding and especially where convenience provides the justification for 
skirting those impediments.  On this view, delegation is anachronistic, 
appropriate to a time when the legislative power was a defensive counter-
balance to the executive threat of tyranny, but inappropriate to a time when 
the executive power is well constrained but the legislative power consti-
tutes the more probable source of government excess. 
III.  DEBATING DELEGATION 
A. Separation of Powers in the Ratification Debates 
Legislative delegation was not a major topic during the ratification de-
bates because more fundamental questions regarding separation of powers 
remained highly controversial.  Arguments focused primarily on the extent 
to which the three branches of government ought to be kept separate from 
one another.  The Anti-Federalists balked at the intermingling of the 
branches, the overlap of functions, and the sharing of powers.42  Citing 
  
 42. See generally Herbert J. Storing, The Anti-Federalist (U. of Chi. Press 1985).  Examples include 
the lack of participation of the House in the treaty-making power, the Senate sitting in judgment of 
president, and the President having a role in legislation via the veto. 
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Montesquieu, they argued that the aggregation of legislative, executive, 
and judicial powers into the same hands was the very definition of tyr-
anny.43  Madison, in a series of essays in The Federalist,44 acknowledged 
Montesquieu’s authority but otherwise exploded the logic of the Anti-
Federalists.  As a practical matter, he painstakingly surveyed the state con-
stitutions, none of which achieved anything like the full separation called 
for by the Anti-Federalists.  As a theoretical matter, he argued that, al-
though complete aggregation of the legislative, executive, and judicial 
powers in one hand would indeed produce tyranny, the judicious marbling 
together of various responsibilities linking one branch to another would 
not.  Rather, it would provide the government with an internal structure in 
which each branch would have procedural mechanisms enabling it to de-
fend its own power.45 
Madison’s argument was predicated on successfully identifying “the 
interest of the man with the constitutional rights of the office.”46  If that 
could be done, then ambition would counteract ambition because officers 
would be jealous of their own powers and so watchful of attempts at usur-
pation.  But delegation gives away power.  If Madison’s theory is correct, 
the advent of delegation implies a lack of “interest convergence” between 
the interests of legislators and the constitutional rights of their office. 
Why might the Constitution have failed to align the interests of the 
man with the constitutional rights of the office?  One public-choice expla-
nation might be that a politician’s ambition, for reelection or for “higher” 
office rather than for power, works in favor of delegation because it bene-
fits the legislator by costlessly eliminating accountability for bad govern-
ance.47  The benefits accrue because, by voting for a legislative program 
but delegating specific rulemaking authority to the executive, the legislator 
can claim credit for directing the government toward popular ends while 
plausibly denying responsibility for unpopular rules. The costs are minimal 
because voters might care less about where the rules are being created than 
about what the content of the rules are, so that unpopular rules will elicit 
reprisals against the administrative agency that promulgated them, rather 
than the legislators who voted to empower the agency.  Other explanations 
abound as well.48  Whether or not such explanations fully capture reality, 
certainly the public-choice model helps us appreciate the difficulty of es-
  
 43. Id.; see also The Federalist No. 47, supra n. 31, at 249 (James Madison). 
 44. The Federalist Nos. 47-51, supra n. 31 (James Madison). 
 45. The Federalist No. 51, supra n. 31 (James Madison). 
 46. Id. 
 47. See e.g. David Schoenbrod, Separation of Powers and the Powers That Be: The Constitutional 
Purposes of the Delegation Doctrine, 36 Am. U. L. Rev. 355 (1987). 
 48. See e.g. Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 Cornell L. Rev. 1 
(1982). 
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tablishing the accountability and sympathy that was so important to the 
Founding generation. 
Madison’s arguments about institutional design ought to be understood 
alongside the fact that distinguishing among categories of governmental 
power was of fundamental importance to the Founders.  Categorical dis-
tinctions are explicit in the text of the Constitution and important to its 
design – each article begins by depositing a type of power in a set of spe-
cific institutions.49  Of course, there was, as noted above, disagreement 
over the precise boundaries between the legislative, executive, and judicial 
powers, but the existence of these separable core concepts was unques-
tioned.  As a result, reliance of the Constitution on notional distinctions 
between types of government power, despite dissent over the boundaries, is 
helpful to understanding the nature of the debate today over the nondelega-
tion doctrine.  Most helpful here is Federalist No. 37, in which Madison 
philosophizes on the difficulties of establishing exact definitions of various 
institutional competencies.  “Experience has instructed us that no skill in 
the science of government has yet been able to discriminate and define, 
with sufficient certainty, its three great provinces – the legislative, execu-
tive, and judiciary.”  He posits three sources of ambiguity: first, the “indis-
tinctness of the object of study,” i.e., man-made institutions; second, the 
“imperfection of the organ of conception,” the inexactitude of human dis-
cernment and abstraction; and third, the inadequacy of descriptive lan-
guage.  “Any one of these must produce a certain degree of obscurity.  The 
[Constitutional] [C]onvention  . . .  must have experienced the full effect of 
them all.”50  And yet, the Constitution was written and agreed upon by the 
vast majority of the delegates, despite their many and passionate disagree-
ments, an “astonish[ing]” feat that Madison uncharacteristically attributes, 
in part, to divine intervention.51 
Madison’s essay suggests that marginal ambiguities, the difficulty of 
line-drawing, ought not to obscure core distinctions recognized by the 
Constitution and critical to its design.  This point, as will be seen in the 
remainder of this article, is central to the nondelegation debate, for the 
most trenchant criticism of nondelegation doctrine is the indefiniteness of 
its application, the difficulty in limning precise boundaries. 
  
 49. “All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which 
shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.”  U.S. Const. art. I, § 1; “The executive Power 
shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.”  U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; “The 
judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as 
the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”  U.S. Const. art. III, § 1. 
 50. The Federalist No. 37, supra n. 31 (James Madison). 
 51. Id. 
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B. The Early Years – The Postal Roads Debate 
If the ratification debates were silent on delegation, congressional prac-
tice after ratification was not.  But, as mentioned above, the implications 
are unclear because most early delegations were arguably of a different sort 
than what concerns modern commentators.  Even so, many viewed delega-
tion as a cause for concern at the time, including President Washington.52 
The first extended congressional debate about delegation of legislative 
powers took place in the Second Congress,53 when the House was consid-
ering a bill establishing particular postal routes, pursuant to its power under 
Article I, Section 8, Clause 7.  Representative Sedgwick proffered an 
amendment that would have allowed the future establishment “from time 
to time” of postal routes by designation of the president.  Several members 
objected to the amendment on the grounds that it would unwisely and un-
constitutionally delegate to the president powers that were specifically 
granted by the Constitution to Congress.  The debate covered the essential 
arguments that are still made today. 
1. Check on the Executive 
Several arguments related primarily to the ability to check the execu-
tive.  Representative Livermore argued that post offices and roads were an 
important conduit of information, particularly about the operation of the 
federal government, whose great distance from the people was a great con-
cern to anti-federalists.  Control over the post roads by a single individual 
was therefore dangerous and inappropriate, for “the dissemination of intel-
ligence might be impeded, and the people kept entirely in the dark with 
respect to the transactions of Government.”54  Representative Hartley wor-
ried about the executive’s ability to raise revenue through the post offices.  
The post office bill, he argued, “has the complexion of a perpetual law . . . 
[and] revenue will be thrown into the power of the Executive.”55  The Brit-
ish and continental European governments  
count upon [the post office] as a considerable branch of revenue . . 
. .We must not suppose that this country will always remain incor-
rupt; we shall share the fate of other nations.  Through the medium 
of the post office a weighty influence may be obtained by the Ex-
  
 52. See Annals of Cong. vol. 1, 234 (1849). 
 53. Id. at 229 et seq. 
 54. Id. at 230. 
 55. Id. at 231. 
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ecutive; . . . we are unnecessarily parting with our revenues, and 
throwing an improper balance into the Executive scale.56   
And Representative White, also seeing in the amendment an “approxima-
tion to the custom of Engl[ish]” practice, worried about influence.  The 
president, he reasoned, might use the post office to coerce the election of 
friends, or to intercept letters and interrupt communication where advanta-
geous.”57 
Representative Bourne responded with the defensive theory of the leg-
islative power – if the delegation upsets the balance of power, Congress 
can always retract the delegation.  Legislative supremacy was what mat-
tered in a constitutional republic.  “The Constitution meant no more than 
that Congress should possess the exclusive right of [exercising the enumer-
ated powers], by themselves or by any other person, which amounts to the 
same thing.”58  Consistent with this approach, he accepted the wisdom of a 
limitation on the duration of the bill’s delegation, so that the question 
would force revisitation by Congress. 
2. Expertise and Accountability 
Other arguments focused on the institutional competence and democ-
ratic accountability of the legislature and the executive.  Arguing for the 
superior expertise of the executive, Sedgwick pointed to his own ignorance 
of particular local circumstances, and, tying accountability to expertise, 
challenged his colleagues “whether they understood the subject so thor-
oughly as the Executive officer would, who being responsible to [all] the 
people . . . must use his utmost diligence in order to a satisfactory execu-
tion of the delegated power.”59  Hartley challenged the possibility of 
greater expertise by appealing to the greater sympathy of representatives – 
if representation meant anything, the House would have the best knowl-
edge of the “people’s interests and circumstances.”60  Representative White 
echoed this judgment on the basis of collective knowledge, saying that 
“[n]o individual could possess an equal share of information with [the] 
House on the subject of the geography of the United States.”61  Any one 
representative might be ignorant of the circumstances obtaining in the dis-
trict of another, he argued, but the sum of knowledge would surpass what 
  
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 233. 
 58. Id. at 232. 
 59. Id. at 230. 
 60. Id. at 231. 
 61. Id. at 233. 
File: Sarvis - 4 Pierce L. Rev. 317 (revised) Created on:  6/18/2006 9:03:00 PM Last Printed: 6/18/2006 9:13:00 PM 
336 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 4, No. 2 
the unitary executive was capable of ascertaining.62  Representative Page 
called it a “paradox” to assert otherwise, and repudiated Sedgwick’s rea-
soning linking accountability and expertise by noting that the greater fre-
quency and directness of elections of representatives defeated the sugges-
tion that the president’s responsibility to the people as a whole was some-
how greater than the responsibility of the House as a whole.63 
Focusing more closely on accountability, Livermore pointed to the 
costs and benefits to be weighed, implying that the representative body 
would be best able to decide what would produce a net public benefit.   
The Post-master, if vested with the power [to establish post offices 
and post roads], might branch out the offices to such a degree as to 
make them a heavy burden to the United States.  In many instances 
the expense is productive of a benefit sufficient to counterbalance 
it; in others, no public benefit arises, but some individuals reap a 
private advantage from the institution, whilst it is injurious to oth-
ers.64 
As noted above, Sedgwick’s position was that the president’s responsibility 
to the people as a whole made him more sensitive to the true quality and 
balance of dispersed local interests.  Representative Barnwell explicated 
this further, offering delegation as a way to avoid the problem posed by 
parochialism – disparate views were inevitable, and the unitary executive 
would offer a solution to the gridlock because it was less partial.65  Repre-
sentative Benson continued this line of thought, recognizing that under the 
Articles of Confederation, bills were often defeated by the numerous “par-
tial and local” causes proposed.66 
Madison the realist responded to the worries about parochialism by 
noting that it was not a major concern.  Rather, the problem was one of 
“accommodating the regulations to the various interests of the different 
parts of the Union.”  He recalled that similar “embarrassments” were 
feared when deliberating on impost and tonnage bills, “business of much 
greater importance and difficulty than this,” yet “it was accomplished.”  
There, Congress depended on “mutual information and reciprocal confi-
dence.”  Each member provided information regarding the particulars of 
his own jurisdiction and trusted the information provided by the other 
members regarding theirs.67 
  
 62. Id. at 237. 
 63. Id. at 234. 
 64. Id. at 237. 
 65. Id. at 235-36. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 238. 
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3. Constitutional Formalism 
Peppered throughout the debate were arguments over the proper impli-
cation of constitutional authority placing the power to establish post offices 
and roads in the hands of the legislature.  Page appealed to the logic of 
republicanism, suggesting that delegation was both unconstitutional and 
“contrary to the interest and spirit of free Government.”  Even if the people 
agreed with the logic of delegation, nevertheless, they “were too wise to 
make the experiment.”  The constitutional separation of powers scheme 
should be followed, he argued, precisely because the people created the 
scheme in order to prevent the government from expediencies like delega-
tion.  Indeed, noted Page, the people already “complain[ed] that Congress 
too often commits to Heads of the Departments what the Constitution re-
quires at their hands.” 68 
The debate therefore settled on the important distinction between ne-
cessity and convenience.  Hartley certainly viewed the delegation as un-
necessary and therefore unwise, but couldn’t decide whether even neces-
sity would justify delegation.  His advice, therefore, was to reject the 
(delegating) amendment,  
try [the unamended bill] for a few years, [and] [i]f, upon experi-
ence, we find ourselves incompetent to the duty, we must (if the 
Constitution will admit) grant the power to the Executive; or, if the 
Constitution will not allow such a delegation, submit the article for 
amendment in a constitutional way.69   
Bourne accepted necessity as a justification and pointed to delegation 
precedent in an excise bill.70  Madison admitted that Congress had previ-
ously delegated the power to create offices in an excise bill, but said that 
the necessity of that situation was absent here.  No necessity existed here 
justifying departure from constitutional principles, for “should there be a 
necessity for additional post roads, they can be provided for by supplemen-
tary laws.”  That, to him, was sufficient to decide the matter: “[T]here 
[does] not appear to be any necessity for alienating the powers of the 
House . . . if [that] should take place, it would be a violation of the Consti-
tution.”71  The pro-delegation arguments “admit of such construction as 
will lead to blending those powers so as to leave no line of separation 
whatever.”72  Sedgwick responded that creation of offices was not “less 
  
 68. Id. at 234. 
 69. Id. at 232. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 238-39. 
 72. Id. at 238. 
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necessary in the multifarious arrangements of post offices,” and therefore 
that the conclusion “that the necessity . . . justifie[s] the expedients . . . 
might be drawn on the present occasion.”73  In some sense, Sedgwick was 
arguing that necessity was in the eye of the beholder.  No necessity, he 
continued, could justify a usurpation of power; either the amendment was 
unconstitutional, in which case the excise bill was too, or both were consti-
tutional. 
4. Indefiniteness and Exaggeration 
The final category reflects the tendency to exaggerate when discussing 
doctrines limited only by the woolly concept of necessity.  In constitutional 
interpretation, virtually every limitation on power is open to exceptions for 
necessity, but some are more open than others.  The nondelegation doc-
trine, based on a contested understanding of the separation of powers doc-
trine that posits an ill-defined legislative power, with an arguable exception 
for necessity, is among the least amenable to bright-line rulemaking. 
Thus, Sedgwick applied the familiar reductio ad absurdum argument 
that if nondelegation is to be enforced strictly, government under the Con-
stitution would be a farce – “is it understood that Congress [is] to go in a 
body to borrow every sum that may be requisite” to discharge the power to 
borrow money without delegation?  Or “work in the Mint themselves?”  Or 
even “act the part of executioners in punishing piracies . . . on the high 
seas?”74  To this, the anti-delegation forces could retort, as Livermore did, 
by appeal to the slippery slope – “if the House [gives] up [determination of 
post roads], they might as well leave all the rest of the business to the dis-
cretion of the Postmaster.”75  Page’s conclusion proved the equal of Sedg-
wick’s in mockery:  
If the motion before the committee succeeds, I shall make one 
which will save a deal of time and money, by making a short ses-
sion of it; for if this House can, with propriety, leave the business 
of the post office to the President, it may leave to him any other 
business of legislation; and I may move to adjourn and leave all 
the objects of legislation to his sole consideration and direction.76 
The debate ended with Sedgwick opining that the duty of the legisla-
tive power was confined to “the establishment of principles.”77  Sedg-
  
 73. Id. at 239. 
 74. Id. at 230-31. 
 75. Id. at 230. 
 76. Id. at 233. 
 77. Id. at 240. 
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wick’s amendment was defeated and the bill that prevailed expressly des-
ignated the various routes to be used for mail delivery.78 
As with many reviews of legislative history, reading the post office bill 
debate does not yield a dispositive interpretation.  Nevertheless, the debate 
does reveal general concerns and modes of thought of the period.  Al-
though the grouping of the arguments above doesn’t follow the chronology 
of the debate, it does clarify the debate by separating the various arguments 
from one another and thereby sets out a framework of a debate that has 
remained fairly consistent over the years: 
The first set of arguments covers the concerns typical of a defensive 
view of the legislative power.  Both sides recognize the importance of con-
straining the executive, but the question is whether the nondelegation doc-
trine is essential to accomplish that end. 
The second set of arguments exhibits concerns especially relevant to 
legislative power of the modern variety.  If government action is predicated 
not simply on popular consent to executive administration but on popular 
will legitimizing affirmative changes to the laws, the means of ascertaining 
the latter are fundamental to the allocation of legislative power and depend 
in part on expertise and accountability.  There are good reasons for prefer-
ring the legislative or the executive department for this or that exercise of 
law-making power.  Yet leaving the question open in each case might be 
problematic for a variety of reasons; for example, the opportunism of a 
dominant faction or party, or an overestimation of the reach and efficacy of 
expertise resulting in a natural bias toward centralized regulation. 
Thus, the third set of arguments, over constitutional norms, becomes 
necessary to explore the importance of ex ante “meta-rules” constraining 
expedient, case-specific distributions of power.  A correlative question is 
whether necessity justifies exceptions to or relaxation of constitutional 
strictures, and how to identify necessity. 
The fourth set of arguments, characterized by a kind of constitutional 
eschatology, shows how the indefiniteness of the nondelegation doctrine, 
the difficulty of consistent line-drawing in delegation cases, lends itself to 
slippery slope and farcical end-state arguments.  Little possible room for 
consensus is left, at the end of debate, other than to agree that something 
ought to remain in the legislative power, and thus we are left with little 
more than the vague assertion that the legislature need provide, at the least, 
“principles” guiding further rulemaking. 
This outline of argumentation proves fairly constant throughout time, 
and indeed, the Supreme Court, after repeated statements of the difficulty 
  
 78. Id. at 241-42. 
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of line-drawing, established as its test a vacuous version of Sedgwick’s 
guiding principle. 
C. The Wonder Years – Contingent Legislation 
Delegating statutes in the first several decades of the nineteenth cen-
tury did not significantly differ from those of these first two congresses.79  
Congress passed a variety of statutes empowering the president or a cabi-
net member to make regulations, but for the most part they pertained to the 
regulation of executive agents.  An important exception was contingent 
legislation, and the contingent tariff in particular, which was the subject of 
the first delegation case to reach the Supreme Court.  The Court’s response 
to contingent legislation would establish a line of precedent that it would 
later depend on to uphold legislative delegations of a very different sort, 
delegations of authority to enact rules regulating private behavior and hav-
ing the force of statutory law. 
“Contingent legislation” is legislation in which Congress conditions 
the force of the new law on a determination to be made by the President.  It 
alters the “rule of recognition”80 identifying the formal passage of a statu-
tory rule into law by adding the president’s proclamation as determinative 
of the legal force of the statutory rule.  Normally, Congress enacts legisla-
tion and, assuming it receives the President’s signature within the requisite 
period, the rules of conduct within the statute thereby become law.  The 
extent to which it is then enforced involves executive discretion, but even 
if enforcement is imperfect or nonexistent, the statute is still formal law, in 
the sense that it purports to be law and is consistent with the procedures for 
formally identifying law.  One can violate the law even if one’s violation 
has no practical consequences.  Such an alteration of the rule of recogni-
tion seems relatively academic and inconsequential in the context of con-
tingent legislation where the contingency is a fairly well-defined factual 
determination.  Little seems to be at stake as far as notice and arbitrariness 
are concerned as long as the factual determination is fairly transparent and 
applicable to all.81  And it has its benefits in that predicating the legal force 
of the rule on a proclamation of an executive finding of fact can increase 
  
 79. Comer, supra n. 14, at 50-56.  
 80. See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 94-95 (Oxford U. Press 1994). 
 81. Note too that if ascertaining the existence of fact situations is the common business of courts, 
even if fact-finding is a necessary appurtenant activity of administration of the laws, judicial review of 
the fact situation rather than the presidential proclamation seems more consonant with basic models of 
separated powers.  Indeed, the tension between these two views regarding the meaning of the proclama-
tion as a determinative finding of fact brings to the foreground the possibility that contingent legislation 
obfuscates not only a delegation of legislative power, but also, in some sense, a delegation of judicial 
power. 
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certainty regarding the force of the rule.  One might conclude, then, that 
contingent legislation is properly understood simply in terms of the defen-
sive view of the legislative power, which would only need exercise when 
factual determinations are made for inappropriate reasons like political 
patronage. 
The first Supreme Court case involving contingent delegation was 
Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States,82 which involved a fairly nar-
row factual determination by the President.  Article I Section 8 of the Con-
stitution empowers Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations.  
Congress began in 1809 to restrict trade with Great Britain, and in 1811 
legislated that the trade embargo would continue if the President declared 
that Great Britain continued to allow violations of United States shipping.  
To some, including the appellant, this amounted to an unconstitutional 
delegation of legislative power.  “To make the revival of a law depend 
upon the President’s proclamation is to give to that proclamation the force 
of a law.”83  The Court disagreed, seeing “no sufficient reason, why the 
legislature should not exercise its discretion in reviving the act of March 
1st, 1809, either expressly or conditionally, as their judgment should di-
rect.”84  The contingency was part of the legislative will, and therefore was 
not actually a delegation of legislative power. 
Contingent legislation, however, has greater implications as the 
breadth of discretion called for expands, or becomes more case-specific.  
Case-specific determinations especially can have the character of arbitrari-
ness, and can even amount to giving the President context-specific rule-
making authority.  Historical accounts of delegation highlight the fact that 
contingent delegations began with narrow factual determinations and 
gradually expanded the discretion involved.  As Arthur Vanderbilt wrote,  
[t]he delegation of legislative power . . . [a]t first was confined to 
permitting the President to pass on simple facts requiring no dis-
cretion, then on more complicated facts requiring the exercise of 
discretion, and then on still more complicated facts that he could 
  
 82. 11 U.S. 382 (1813).  For a recent colloquy of Cargo of the Brig Aurora arriving at some novel 
conclusions see Gary Lawson, Comment, Burning Down the House (and Senate): A Presentment 
Requirement for Legislative Subpoenas Under the Orders, Resolutions, and Votes Clause, 83 Tex.  
L. Rev. 1373, 1379-80 (2005) (responding to Seth Barrett Tillman, A Textualist Defense of Article I, 
Section 7, Clause 3: Why Hollingsworth v. Virginia Was Rightly Decided, and Why INS v. Chadha Was 
Wrongly Reasoned, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1265 (2005)), and Seth Barrett Tillman, Reply, The Domain of 
Constitutional Delegations Under the Orders, Resolutions, and Votes Clause, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1389, 
1391 n. 6 (2005) (distinguishing intra-congressional from cross-branch congressional delegations). 
 83. The Brig Aurora, 11 U.S. at 386. 
 84. Id. at 388. 
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arrive at only with expert administrative assistance.  The trend was 
irresistible.85 
Comer describes a similar storyline; over time, the scope of discretion in-
creased, the subject matter broadened, and the legislative instruction and 
guidance attenuated.86 
It is difficult to reach agreement on what counts as too much discre-
tion.  In the 1920s, the United States Tariff Commission recommended 
that, in order to create a more effective reciprocal tariff regime, in which 
import tariffs reflected the like tariffs and trade practices of other nations, 
the President ought to be given discretion to impose new duties, subject to 
general principles and statutory limitations.  The resulting Tariff Act of 
1922 gave the President power to levy tariffs of between ten and fifty per-
cent in order to offset the benefits foreign goods received on account of 
“unfair” methods of competition.  In extreme cases of unfair competition, 
the President could even ban importation of certain items where the inter-
est of the country should require it.  These restrictions were decried as a 
patent “inject[ion] into international relations [of] the principles upon 
which the Federal Trade Commission works for fairness and decency in 
domestic business.”87  Detractors viewed unfairness as so lacking in sub-
stantive content that the discretionary power of the executive amounted to 
legislation, especially given that the discretion involved the power to levy 
tariffs, which were seen as unambiguously legislative.  Add to this the fact 
that the statute limited judicial review of questions of law to the Court of 
Customs Appeals, with final appeal to the Supreme Court, and the scope of 
delegation, to opponents of the bill, seemed breathtaking. 
Given the gradual broadening of the contingencies on which contin-
gent legislation depended, and the inability to pinpoint what constitutes 
“too much” discretion, it is perhaps reasonable to see congressional action 
and the Court’s jurisprudence as exemplifying the slippery slope fears of 
Representative Livermore and his allies.  Had early cases confronted legis-
lation delegating broad rulemaking powers typical of modern delegating 
acts, the Court’s nondelegation jurisprudence might have turned out sig-
nificantly different today.  On the other hand, the Progressive Era response 
to industrialized society wrought such fundamental change in perceptions 
about government that perhaps nothing would be different – any differ-
ences might have been washed away along with the jurisprudence of the 
Lochner era. 
  
 85. Arthur T. Vanderbilt, The Doctrine of the Separation of Powers and Its Present Day Signifi-
cance (U. of Neb. Press 1963). 
 86. See generally Comer, supra n. 14, at ch. III, VII, VIII. 
 87. Id. at 95 (quoting Wallace McClure, A New American Commercial Policy 57 (1922)). 
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D. The Mature Years – Administrative Agencies and Congress as Parlia-
ment 
The full history of the rise of the regulatory state is obviously beyond 
the scope of this article.  But it suffices to say that, by the time the Su-
preme Court began reviewing modern administrative rulemaking, the 
Court could draw on almost a century of precedent deferring to legislative 
delegations of various sorts.  Already in 1916, New York conservative 
Elihu Root could say that “[t]he old [nondelegation] doctrine prohibiting 
the delegation of legislative power has virtually retired from the field and 
given up the fight.”88 
The frequency of delegation, but more importantly the growing extent 
of it, troubled many at the turn of the twentieth century.  With the rise of 
administrative agencies, legislative delegation took on a different charac-
ter, for now the executive was increasingly being called upon to write the 
laws, in some cases almost ex nihilo, a far cry from the delegations of in-
ternally applicable rulemaking and narrower versions of contingent legisla-
tion.  A slew of books and articles appeared early in the new century, both 
here and in Britain, questioning the propriety and wisdom of rampant dele-
gation.89  Yet even critics often admitted a need for delegation.  The per-
ceived solution to the dislocations of industrialization wedded arguments 
about institutional competence to claims of necessity.90  Most felt that the 
increased complexity of modern industrialized society meant that govern-
ment action needed to increase in complexity to keep apace.  Given the 
era’s growing belief in scientific expertise and utopian planning, adminis-
trative bodies promised the institutional capacity for the kind of central 
planning needed in the modern age.  As a result, commentators wrung their 
hands about the implications for separation of powers doctrine and democ-
ratic accountability, but still generally accepted claims of the necessity of 
delegation.  Like the Court in past decisions, they mentioned in passing the 
obvious existence of some limits on delegation, but no one was able to 
explain the substantive content of those limits, or how they could be identi-
fied. 
Yet, as the post office debate showed, one man’s necessity is another 
man’s expedience.  Given the modern retreat from other constitutional 
  
 88. Vanderbilt, supra n. 85, at 80 (quoting Elihu Root, Addresses on Government and Citizenship 
534 (Bacon & Scott eds., 1916)). 
 89. See e.g. Carr, supra n. 6; Chen, Parliamentary Opinion of Delegated Legislation (Columbia U. 
Press 1933); Comer, supra n. 14, at 11-13 and accompanying notes; A.V. Dicey, Law of the Constitu-
tion (London, 1915). 
 90. See e.g. Comer, supra n. 14, at 11-13 and accompanying notes; see also John B. Cheadle, The 
Delegation of Legislative Functions, 27 Yale L.J. 892, 892-93, 900 (1917-1918). 
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changes that occurred or gained momentum in the Progressive era, it is 
worth questioning whether the claims of necessity and the Supreme 
Court’s application of precedent led to a misguided acceptance of modern 
legislative delegation. A closer look at the political discourse of the age 
reveals that many were aware, even if they didn’t make it explicit, that it 
was as much ideology as perceived necessity that influenced constitutional 
theorizing.  No doubt fundamental changes in the inherent quality of mod-
ern society helped convince many to accept delegation as a modern neces-
sity, but scientism, political theory and ideology, and a belief in planning 
and social change through law impelled others to affirmatively desire dele-
gation.91 
The 1870s had already seen agitation for a more vigorous public ad-
ministration of the economic and social order when, for example, Wood-
row Wilson, in 1879, published a paper expounding the virtues of cabinet 
government in England.  His view was that a stronger executive was nec-
essary to balance the legislature, which was a decidedly conservative insti-
  
 91. See generally Daniel T. Rodgers, In Search of Progressivism, in Reviews in American History 
113, 10 (The Johns Hopkins U. Press 1982) (discussing the various (and often conflicting) sources of 
Progressive Era calls for reform).  As an example of the intellectual underpinnings, consider Woodrow 
Wilson, who wrote at length on the desirability of an expert administrative regime in The Study of 
Administration.  His theory was one of instrumentalism and strident ideology.  Typical of his writings 
are passages such as this: 
 
The problem is to make public opinion efficient without suffering it to be meddlesome. Di-
rectly exercised, in the oversight of the daily details and in the choice of the daily means of 
government, public criticism is of course a clumsy nuisance, a rustic handling delicate ma-
chinery. But as superintending the greater forces of formative policy alike in politics and 
administration, public criticism is altogether safe and beneficent, altogether indispensable. 
Let administrative study find the best means for giving public criticism this control and for 
shutting it out from all other interference. 
 
Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp? 
document=465 (Nov. 1, 1886).  In contrast to the lengthy treatment he gives to the many reasons for 
desiring an administrative state, he merely asserts in passing that the administrative state is “a business 
necessity” and then moves on to pacify fears regarding the rise of a bureaucratic class.  Considering the 
fact that breathtakingly vituperative views of bureaucracy were not unknown in the nineteenth century, 
the conclusory nature of Wilson’s statement cannot be supposed to reflect a uniform acceptance of the 
necessity of bureaucracy.  For an example of an anti-bureaucracy screed, consider the opening to John 
Henderson’s Considerations on the Constitutionality of the President’s Proclamations:  
 
The history of nations teaches one universal truth, – namely, that administrative power in 
Government has an eternal tendency to augmentation.  The captivating bauble is ever being 
fondled and nursed into extension, and under pleas of necessity, the public good, or the 
bolder warrant of undisguised usurpation, its dimensions are enlarged, till, like the frog in 
the fable, its end is explosion. Deplore it as we may, the rule has no exception. Vigilance and 
integrity may do much to postpone the catastrophe, but the cankerous evil is never cured. 
 
John Henderson, Considerations on the Constitutionality of the President’s Proclamations,  
http://www.constitution.org/cmt/hendj/ccpp.txt (1854).  Wilson’s body of work is a self-consciously 
strident work of political science, not a rationalization of changes resignedly accepted out of necessity. 
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tution impeding progressive changes.  Wilson conceived of the separation 
of powers as having isolated the branches of government, and viewed 
cabinet government as “a device for bringing the executive and legislative 
branches into harmony and co-operation without uniting or confusing their 
functions.” 92  His model of government downplayed the importance of 
constitutional limitations on government action, whether Madison’s idea of 
using ambition to counteract ambition or the use of indirect election to vary 
paths of accountability, instead preferring ease of governmental action 
through more direct democratic control by the people and fluid cooperation 
between branches.  
Put simply, Progressives who advocated greater governmental action 
felt they could get more done in the agencies.  Implicit in Wilson’s argu-
ment was happy acceptance that delegation would circumvent the Foun-
ders attempts to create constraints on the legislature.  Those constraints, to 
Wilson, were “conservative” impediments to progressivism rather than 
meta-rules embodying wisdom painfully learned through experience. 
To give one example how delegation meshed with Progressives’ predi-
lection for economic and social planning, and how it could potentially 
make interest-group capture of policy much easier, consider the Tariff 
Commission Vice Chairman’s statements in 1922 regarding the Commis-
sion’s recommendations mentioned above.  It is “evident that in some such 
flexible provision as this lies the only hope of an effective [protection] of 
American industry against the variety and subtlety of the attacks which 
may be included under the term unfair competition.”93  The increasing im-
portance of trade in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and government 
efforts to support and protect American industry, explain why tariff bills 
were among the most likely to delegate discretion to the executive, as well 
as why such bills were frequently the subject of attack in the courts.  Do-
mestic interest groups clearly appreciated the fact that delegation helped 
circumvent structural impediments to legislation. 
Time and again, the concentration of both rulemaking and executive 
power was tempered by concern for constitutional values regarding protec-
tion of liberty and restraint of power.  Constitutional standards of notice 
and procedure were imported as models for constraining agency action.  
Thus, administrative due process and related concepts, even the idea of 
separating functions within agencies, arose, either judicially or by statute, 
to take the place of constitutional constraints circumvented by delegation.  
In some sense, there is a contradiction in the Wilsonian arguments against 
  
 92. See Vile, supra n. 1, at 296. 
 93. Comer, supra n. 14, at 97 (quoting McClure, supra n. 87, at 53-54 (quoting a 1922 address made 
before the American Manufacturing Export Association)). 
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formalist respect for constitutional separation of powers and its related 
procedural requirements.  Such requirements are laid aside as anachronistic 
even as they are reinvented in more palatable forms.  All that really hap-
pened, of course, was an extra-constitutional rebalancing in favor of 
weaker constraints and more government action.  The nondelegation doc-
trine, as a result of its placement in the hands of the same legislative 
branch that it was theorized to constrain, was easily laid aside. 
The real constitution of the modern administrative state is the corpus of 
delegating acts and the many congressional statutes regulating executive 
discretion and rulemaking power.  Congress is the constitutional body of 
the administrative state – our Parliament.  By 1950, Vanderbilt could write, 
“When we consider the aggregate amount of executive legislation, . . . , we 
are quickly impressed with the fact that the executive branch of the gov-
ernment, including here the administrative agencies, derives more power 
by delegation from Congress than it does from the Constitution itself.”94  It 
was at this time that the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), an elabo-
rate blueprint aimed at regularizing executive action where the broadest 
discretion exists, was coming into the picture.  The advent of the APA, 
along with the rise of judicial deference to agency interpretation and ad-
ministrative adjudication, was the final major move that reduced the aims 
of procedure to mere notice, regularity, and transparency, rather than also 
substantive constraint on law-making.  The role of Congress in the overall 
structure of the modern administrative state comports more with the older, 
defensive conception of the legislative power, even though the legislative 
power exercised by administrative agencies is decidedly modern and posi-
tivist. 
IV. THE MODERN DEBATE 
A. Can Judicial Review Work? 
The modern arguments over delegation are mainly more elaborate and 
precise versions of the arguments from the early republic.  Even though the 
nature of delegation has changed dramatically, democratic accountability, 
expertise, necessity, and concentration of power remain the primary points 
of contention.  One major difference, though, is the primacy of judicial 
review in modern discussions.  As Tocqueville noted, in America, virtually 
every dispute ultimately finds its way to and is resolved in a court.95  This 
  
 94. Vanderbilt, supra n. 85, at 79.  
 95. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy In America 270 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence trans., 
Doubleday 1969). 
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is probably at least as true today as it was when he wrote.  Certainly, the 
dominance of the judiciary in resolving constitutional questions is greater 
than it was in early American history.  The Founders supposed that politics 
would sustain much of the constitutional balance, but where that has been 
perceived to have failed, the Court has taken upon itself to bolster the po-
litical efforts (or lack thereof) with judicial enforcement of various struc-
tural features of the Constitution. 
Given the sheer extent of delegation today, however, and the current 
low regard for formalism (especially formal distinctions between legisla-
tive and executive powers), the Court’s unwillingness to breathe life into 
the nondelegation doctrine is at least comprehensible.  Judicial review of 
delegation is not unknown to the Court, but neither are its difficulties and 
the political reactions to it.  The Court from the very beginning explicitly 
recognized the indefiniteness of distinctions between the legislative and 
executive powers. 
In 1825, in Wayman v. Southard,96 the Court considered legislative 
delegation to the judiciary of rulemaking powers governing judicial proce-
dure.  Arguably, this type of power is akin to the early delegations of rule-
making power governing executive officials rather than private individuals.  
The Court distinguished between powers that are “strictly and exclusively” 
legislative from powers that the legislature “may rightfully exercise it-
self.”97  By implication, the powers vested in Congress included a nondele-
gable core of exclusively legislative powers and a delegable periphery of 
powers exercisable by other branches of the government.  
The line has not been exactly drawn which separates those impor-
tant subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the legislature it-
self, from those of less interest, in which a general provision may 
be made, and power given to those who are to act under such gen-
eral provisions to fill up the details.98   
The Court, after nodding to the principle of separation of powers but de-
clining the opportunity to expound upon its contours, noted simply that 
“the maker of the law may commit something to the discretion of the other 
departments, and the precise boundary of this power is a subject of delicate 
and difficult inquiry, into which a Court will not enter unnecessarily.”99  
Comer mockingly parades the various linguistic references to the nondele-
gable legislative power to show the impossibility of precision:  
  
 96. 23 U.S. 1 (1825). 
 97. Id. at 43. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 45-46. 
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Chief Justice Marshall used the terms ‘general principles,’ ‘great 
outlines,’ ‘important outlines’ to express that part of legislation 
which, in his opinion, could not be delegated.  Later the terms 
‘purpose,’ ‘criterion,’ ‘general provisions,’ ‘general rules,’ ‘terms 
of the statute,’ ‘predicate,’ ‘theory of the Act,’ ‘congressional in-
tention,’ ‘purely legislative power,’ ‘legal principles that control,’ 
‘policy of the law,’ ‘objects of the law,’ ‘vital provisions,’ ‘general 
scheme,’ [and] ‘primary standard’ . . . have been used to express 
the same idea.100 
Judicial forthrightness about the indefiniteness of distinctions is per-
haps not surprising, and it certainly gives credence to the slippery slope 
explanation for the lack of an enforceable nondelegation doctrine.  With a 
firm grounding in precedent on one side, and nothing but a diaphanous 
concept on the other, marginally broader delegations naturally appear more 
akin to previously accepted practice than not.  Certainly legislative practice 
as much as judicial precedent supported some level of delegation.  Al-
though the Court in The Brig Aurora did not reflect upon early practice, a 
later Court would.   
In Field v. Clark,101 decided in 1892, the appellant made the above-
mentioned distinction between contingency on a fact and contingency on a 
proclamation of the executive.  Here, though, the proclamation regarded 
not simply a proclaimed fact but a judgment of the President.102  The Court 
spent little ink declaring that the argument in The Brig Aurora provided the 
rule that settled the matter.  The Court also looked to contingent statutes 
from as early as 1794, passed with the approval of early presidents as cele-
brated as Washington, Adams, Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe; further 
enactments throughout the middle of the nineteenth century, passed under 
Jackson, Pierce, and others; and statutory proclamations by virtually every 
president of the nineteenth century.  Though such legislative precedents 
would perhaps not have as much weight for the supreme judiciary today, at 
that time it provided “great weight in determining the question.”  The 
Court upheld the contingent legislation. 
In J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States,103 the Court sustained the 
President’s discretion to raise tariffs on particular goods according to the 
statutory command to equalize the costs of production.  Congress could 
have written the law to declare the amount of the tariff to be that differen-
  
 100. Comer, supra n. 14, at 124 (citations omitted). 
 101. 143 U.S. 649 (1892). 
 102. Id. at 680. The judgment involved deciding whether another country’s trade policies were “re-
ciprocally unequal and unreasonable.” 
 103. 276 U.S. 394 (1928). 
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tial between internal and external costs of production, rather than setting 
numerical amounts and empowering the President to vary them to achieve 
production-cost equality.  But the Court did not look at the case so nar-
rowly.  Rather, the Court declared that Congress could delegate discretion 
to the executive “according to common sense and the inherent necessities 
of the governmental co-ordination.”104  In particular, the Court stated that 
legislative action that “lay[s] down . . . an intelligible principle” to which 
the executive official or agency must conform does not amount to “a for-
bidden delegation of legislative power.”105  This, then, is the articulated 
rule of the Court’s nondelegation doctrine. 
The “intelligible principle” principle did little for clarity.  Certainly, 
delegating acts were criticized as vague from the beginning.  Robert 
Reeder wrote of the various delegating acts pertaining to the Interstate 
Commerce Commission that “the statutes do not appear to use the word 
‘reasonable’ in any other sense which is so definite that . . . a grant of 
power to name ‘reasonable rates’ would be constitutional.”106  Reeder ac-
cepted the argument that the legislature need only lay forth a “definite 
principle,” but when such a principle is lacking, or when a term “is inextri-
cably bound up with other terms which are indefinite, the entire clause 
seems to be unconstitutional.  This is true in the case of the Interstate 
Commerce Act.”107  But clearly the courts did not agree. 
The early decades of the twentieth century, through the New Deal, 
were the final battleground for the nondelegation doctrine.  The number of 
cases coming before the Court increased for a variety of reasons, among 
them the practice of railroad price-setting and the war-time discretion 
given to President Wilson during World War I.  Invariably, the delegations 
were upheld, whether on account of necessity and emergency or on the 
rationale that intelligible principles like reasonableness and public interest 
sufficiently guided, if they did not actually limit, the discretion of the ex-
ecutive.  After the war, however, congressional debates were more com-
mon than at any time in history.  Perhaps because of these debates, in the 
middle of the New Deal, the Court proved people like Elihu Root wrong by 
striking down central features of the National Industrial Recovery Act on 
nondelegation grounds (among others).   
  
 104. Id. at 406. 
 105. Id. at 409. 
 106. Reeder, Rate Regulation as Affected by the Distribution of Governmental Powers in the Consti-
tutions, 57 U. Pa. L. Rev. 59, 99 (1908). 
 107. Id. at 100. 
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Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan108 and A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. 
United States109 are famous today as the lone cases in which the Court en-
forced the nondelegation doctrine.  Their story is too well-told to need 
summary here, but suffice it to say that the Court found in those two cases 
that the National Industrial Recovery Act offered virtually no guidance to 
the executive whatsoever.  Given the ease of announcing some idea, how-
ever vague, that might be dressed up as an intelligible principle, those were 
rather remarkable rulings.  
The Court has been unwilling to strike down delegations since those 
cases.  One commentator sums up judicial attempts at enforcing nondele-
gation as having produced “among the most confused and confusing bodies 
of judicial thinking that one will ever encounter.”110  Occasional justices 
have written opinions in cases where they recognize a delegation of legis-
  
 108. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). 
 
[I]n every case in which the question has been raised, the Court has recognized that there are 
limits of delegation which there is no constitutional authority to transcend. We think that § 9 
(c) [of the National Industrial Recovery Act] goes beyond those limits. As to the transporta-
tion of oil production in excess of state permission, the Congress has declared no policy, has 
established no standard, has laid down no rule. There is no requirement, no definition of cir-
cumstances and conditions in which the transportation is to be allowed or prohibited. 
 
  If § 9 (c) were held valid, it would be idle to pretend that anything would be left of limita-
tions upon the power of the Congress to delegate its law-making function. The reasoning of 
the many decisions we have reviewed would be made vacuous and their distinctions nuga-
tory. Instead of performing its law-making function, the Congress could at will and as to 
such subjects as it chose transfer that function to the President or other officer or to an ad-
ministrative body. The question is not of the intrinsic importance of the particular statute be-
fore us, but of the constitutional processes of legislation which are an essential part of our 
system of government. 
 
Id. at 430. 
 109. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
 
Section 3 of the [National Industrial] Recovery Act is without precedent. It supplies no stan-
dards for any trade, industry or activity. It does not undertake to prescribe rules of conduct to 
be applied to particular states of fact determined by appropriate administrative procedure. 
Instead of prescribing rules of conduct, it authorizes the making of codes to prescribe them. 
For that legislative undertaking, § 3 sets up no standards, aside from the statement of the 
general aims of rehabilitation, correction and expansion described in section one. In view of 
the scope of that broad declaration, and of the nature of the few restrictions that are imposed, 
the discretion of the President in approving or prescribing codes, and thus enacting laws for 
the government of trade and industry throughout the country, is virtually unfettered. We 
think that the code-making authority thus conferred is an unconstitutional delegation of leg-
islative power. 
 
Id. at 541-42. 
 110. Lawson, Federal Administrative Law, supra n. 17, at 174.  
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lative power, but these have invariably failed to gain support.111  Though 
the Court maintains a nondelegation doctrine in theory, it is one that is 
clearly unlikely to produce vigorous judicial review in fact.  Many con-
temporary scholars no doubt view this as a good thing; to them, judicial 
review of delegation is impracticable because any judicial test would be 
inconsistent at best and arbitrary and political at worst.  Others think it is 
high time for the courts to reconsider enforcing the nondelegation doctrine. 
B. Making the “Intelligible Principle” Principle Intelligible 
The argument against judicial review of delegation based on its arbi-
trariness, merits reconsideration.  The difficulty of judicial line-drawing in 
enforcing the nondelegation doctrine doesn’t justify abandoning the project 
altogether; strict enforcement (e.g., by requiring legislative enactment of 
regulatory codes before courts recognize them as law) is an option that 
avoids much of the difficulty while remaining consistent with the Constitu-
tion’s vesting of all legislative power in Congress.112  But it is also worth 
questioning whether judicial line-drawing is indeed so unguided as to be 
arbitrary, and further whether the unavoidable inconsistency really renders 
judicial enforcement a bad idea.  This section explores the former question, 
the next section explores the latter. 
The line of Supreme Court cases that led to an “intelligible principle” 
test (and then rendered it vacuous) began with cases of rather limited ex-
ecutive discretion different in kind from what is seen in modern delegating 
statutes, which give to agencies broad and almost unfettered rulemaking 
authority.  These early precedents were applied without searching scrutiny 
into the aptness of the analogy between early and modern delegations. As a 
result, the courts have failed to give real, biting meaning to the “intelligible 
principle” test.  The academic literature in recent years has attempted to fill 
in the void.  David Schoenbrod’s articles on delegation provides the most 
interesting and sustained attempt to make the “intelligible principle” prin-
ciple intelligible.113 
Schoenbrod resurrects the formalist, or categorical, mode of thought 
that focuses on whether an exercise of power is “legislative” or not.  In-
spired by Hayek’s explication in Law, Legislation & Liberty, Schoenbrod 
  
 111. See Indus. Union Dept. v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 671 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concur-
ring in the judgment); see also Field, 143 U.S. at 699-700 (Lamar & Fuller, JJ., dissenting). 
 112. Justice Thomas appears to be open to the proposition that something of the kind is at least on its 
face more consistent with the explicit and implicit dictates of the Constitution. See Whitman v. Am. 
Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 486-88 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring).  
 113. See David Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give It Substance?, 83 Mich. 
L. Rev. 1223 (1985). 
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begins from the premise introduced into the delegation debate by Sedgwick 
that there is a core of the legislative power – the ability to issue general 
rules of just conduct.  Schoenbrod suggests that legislation today can be 
divided into two broad categories, which he calls “rules statutes” and “goal 
statutes.”  Statutes of the former type include within the legislation itself 
the rules of conduct individuals must obey; they define the difference be-
tween lawful and unlawful behavior.  Statutes of the latter type spell out 
the governmental goals to be pursued and empower agencies to issue the 
actual rules of conduct.  In Schoenbrod’s schema, goals announce the pur-
pose of the statutory enactment; somewhat like preambles, they are not a 
statutory enactment by themselves – only the rules are.  Therefore, rules 
statutes are valid, in Schoenbrod’s view, while goals statutes are an uncon-
stitutional delegation of legislative power.  For example, a tax statute list-
ing tax brackets and rates is a rules statute and a valid exercise of legisla-
tive power without delegation; a tax statute naming a revenue target and 
empowering the tax commissioner to raise the target amount by establish-
ing tax brackets and rates is a goals statute and a delegation of legislative 
power.114 
Distinguishing between goals statutes and rules statutes is important, 
says Schoenbrod, because goals can conflict, and an axiom of democratic 
republicanism is that the difficult decisions regarding which goals should 
take precedence and to what extent, and how they should be translated into 
legal rules, are to be made by the representative body making up the legis-
lature.115  Goals statutes therefore delegate the core legislative power be-
cause the difficult decisions are not made by the legislature.  As a result, 
otherwise represented interests are no longer represented when the difficult 
decisions are made; the benefits of a large republic that Madison outlined 
in Federalist No. 51 are jettisoned by removing decisions from the nation-
ally representative Congress.  And representatives cannot be held account-
able by their constituencies; they get the benefit of voting for laudable 
goals, but they avoid the costs of voting for or against particular rules 
which some will find unfavorable. 
Of course, distinctions of the kind Schoenbrod proposes are always 
more easily made in illustrative hypotheticals than in practice.  Legislative 
language is, and always has been, filled with imprecise language.  Is “rea-
sonableness” a goal or a rule?  The principal argument against a judicial 
enforcement of nondelegation is that there is no coherent and consistent 
  
 114. Id. at 1252-60. 
 115. Id.  One might add, with interpretive help from juries, the original instrument through which the 
people exercised the right to participate in the execution of the laws.  Schoenbrod’s view on legislation, 
it ought to be noted, does deviate from Hayek’s; most notably, Hayek does not argue against delega-
tion, saying the decision to delegate is a question of expedience. 
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way to police the distinction that Schoenbrod embraces, no way to distin-
guish between interpretation and policy-making where discretion is re-
quired in executing an ambiguous or imprecise law.  Perhaps it is even a 
distinction without a difference, and all discretion is law-making, pure and 
simple. 
Schoenbrod admits the inescapable imprecision of language, especially 
statutory language, but he responds by pointing out that otherwise ambigu-
ous words can become infused with legal meaning sufficient to amount to a 
rule of behavior even if it is not entirely precise – “reasonableness” in tort 
law is the most obvious example of such a word.  Schoenbrod’s assertion is 
based on a background theory of customary law.  Here, the influence of 
Hayek is palpable.  Where there is a background social norm, otherwise 
ambiguous words can be understood by reference to it.  Reference to cus-
tom can draw on widely accepted private practice, or on the body of legal 
rules in existence, the specific instances of which provide data points giv-
ing rise to inferences about the relative importance of various goals and 
interests.  Thus, custom gives Schoenbrod an extra-textual tool to give 
meaning to otherwise ambiguous statements of law. 
Speed limits provide an interesting example of how customary behav-
ior (in the form of ordinary traffic patterns) can join technical engineering 
principles (such as road surface and width) to give guidance for the estab-
lishment of rules.  On an ordinary roadway presenting no unusual safety 
concerns, speed limits are generally set at the 85th percentile speed based 
on studies showing that faster drivers have worse driving records and cause 
a disproportionate number of accidents.116  The existence of technical and 
behavioral standards thus helps invest with meaning a statute’s command 
to drive at a “reasonable and prudent” speed. 
Nevertheless, it is still possible to object that the use of such back-
ground technical and behavioral principles is still insufficiently determina-
tive or prescriptive, thus making the imposition of speed limits no better 
than any other example of administrative legislating.  If one judge would 
require even speed limits to be numerically enacted by the legislature, 
while another judge would view a mere statutory preamble as providing 
sufficient guidance for administrative rulemaking, mustn’t one despair of 
finding sufficient virtue in a judicially enforced nondelegation doctrine?  
Not necessarily. 
  
 116. See e.g. Road Commission for Oakland County, How Fast is Too Fast, at 
http://www.rcocweb.org/data/Speed.pdf (accessed May 22, 2006); see also Va. Dept. of Transp., Speed 
Limits FAQ, at http://www.virginiadot.org/comtravel/faq-speedlimits.asp (accessed May 22, 2006). 
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C. Getting it Right – Don’t Be Afraid to Be Wrong 
We should not shy away from the fact that formal categories are an 
important aspect of the Constitution, not to mention law more generally.  
The Founders viewed the separate powers of government as distinct and 
definable, even if agreement on their precise definitions or boundaries was 
elusive.  Madison’s Federalist No. 37 stressed that core classifications in 
political science ought not to be undermined by borderline ambiguities. 
The Post Office debates show how Madison persisted in this view with 
regard to legislative delegation.  Categorical thinking, later associated with 
legal formalism, may have fallen into disrepute with the rise of legal real-
ism and, later, critical legal theory, but Madison’s argument from Federal-
ist No. 37, that marginal indefiniteness is not contrary to overall doctrinal 
coherence, remains an important consideration in understanding how the 
judiciary can give muscle to doctrines preserving the integrity of the con-
stitutional scheme.  A reassessment of the practicability of judicial line-
drawing in the context of legislative delegation is in order. 
The judicial enforcement of nondelegation is not as hopeless as some 
would suggest.  Even if it is conceded to be inconsistent and even arbitrary, 
notwithstanding Schoenbrod’s arguments, that does not imply that it would 
necessarily entail injustice, overall inaccuracy, or inefficacy.  Arbitrariness 
in dispensing justice in individual cases (which the rule of law is aimed at 
eradicating) is a danger to liberty; but arbitrariness in enforcing constitu-
tional limitations on government action is not necessarily a danger to lib-
erty if the laws deemed valid must still be equally applied.  Those who 
argue against judicial enforcement of nondelegation too quickly assume 
the evils of potential inconsistency in striking down instances of legislative 
delegation.  By focusing too closely on the individual case, arguments 
against judicial enforcement of the nondelegation doctrine miss the forest 
for the trees. 
Consider the distinction in scientific measurement between accuracy 
and precision.  Precision means that repeated measurements vary little, 
irrespective of the reliability of the mean measurement (how close it is to 
the actual value).  Accuracy, with respect to repeated measurements, means 
that the aggregated measurements approximate the true value fairly closely 
even though individual measurements might vary from one another sub-
stantially (repeated measurements produce a mean close to the actual 
value).  One can conceivably have accuracy without precision or precision 
without accuracy. 
In some areas of law, errant decision-making can effect great injustice, 
as with imprisonment for false criminal convictions.  In those cases, the 
judicial system must, as a matter of justice, be both precise and accurate.  
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But in other legal contexts, precision may be less of a concern and the 
benefits of relaxing such a constraint become considerable.  With delegat-
ing acts, errant judicial decisions arguably pose little harm; if a court va-
cates rules because they were not enacted by the legislature, those rules 
that are sufficiently desirable can be revisited and passed explicitly by the 
legislature.117 
A potential objection is that arbitrary enforcement of nondelegation ul-
timately results in arbitrary results in individual cases.  This objection is 
vitiated in three ways.  First, it would depend on the narrowness of rulings 
regarding impermissible delegations.  A broad ruling that invalidated a 
major provision of the regulatory code, or even a provision of the statute 
giving rise to the code, would present less inconsistency, or at least no in-
consistency problems different from those of other common exercises of 
judicial review resulting in invalidations of statutes.  A narrow holding on 
the other hand (e.g., that a rule, if held to reach a certain fact pattern, would 
amount to executive legislating because the defendant would have had no 
notice from the text of the statute that his behavior was colorably of ques-
tionable legality) might produce less guidance for and greater variance 
across future cases.  But as-applied challenges (which are arguably more 
consistent with the classical model of judicially modest case-by-case adju-
dication) are obviously not uncommon in constitutional law.   
Second, and more importantly, the inconsistency is in fact not of great 
concern because rules established by an administrative body ought to pro-
vide a kind of safe harbor, in that individuals abiding by those rules risk no 
liability.  Any individual whose behavior falls within the gray area is on 
notice of and voluntarily assumes the risk that the court will view the rule 
in question not as impermissibly delegated legislative power but as a valid 
interpretive exercise of executive power.   
Third, if concerns about legislative delegation are worth taking seri-
ously, it would be a strange result to argue that the injustice arising from 
inconsistent application of the nondelegation doctrine should result in its 
nonapplication.  If the Constitution requires laws be passed by the legisla-
ture in which “all legislative power . . . shall be vested,” then demands for 
consistency ought to produce a jurisprudence that errs in favor of respect-
ing the categorical distinctions recognized by the Constitution. 
Thus, the major concern not ought to be the precision, but rather the 
overall accuracy of judicially enforced nondelegation, i.e., on the aggre-
  
 117. One might argue that this is no different from the argument that rules created by agencies con-
tradicting the will of the legislature can easily be overturned by the legislature.  But the difference is in 
which presumption is more consistent with constitutional norms, and whether legislative inaction has 
recognizable meaning. 
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gate effect of the judicial decisions.  Decisions will err in both directions 
(too strict and too lenient), but there is no reason to doubt that they will in 
the aggregate achieve the overall purpose of ensuring more legislative de-
cisions are indeed made by the legislature.  If that is true, judicial review of 
delegation on the whole would be effective even if indefinite and inconsis-
tent.  The costs of “errors” in specific cases, being small, would be out-
weighed by the overall effectiveness in forcing rulemaking back into the 
legislature.118 
Legislative delegation is admittedly difficult to appraise in the abstract.  
No doubt there would be accusations of politically inspired adjudication.  
But again, although individual decisions may be prone to convincing at-
tacks of result-oriented decision-making, nevertheless the aggregate effect 
of nondelegation decisions might well prove to be apolitical, because either 
party is prone to favoring or opposing delegation when advantageous or 
disadvantageous to its interests.  Furthermore, if nondelegation decisions 
do not address the specific content of laws, then even politically motivated 
decisions have little political effect beyond readjusting the specificity re-
quired in legislation, the contents of which will be decided by the political 
branches. 
Resurrecting the nondelegation doctrine would certainly cause friction 
and uncertainty for several years while legislative practice readjusts, but an 
equilibrium would likely evolve over time, and more rulemaking govern-
ing private behavior would have to pass through the legislature by the ap-
propriate constitutional procedures, thereby better ensuring a greater de-
gree of popular agreement and general public welfare from the laws than is 
currently achieved. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Originally, law was conceived primarily in terms of background prin-
ciples of justice, and the legislative power was conceived as a restraint on 
arbitrariness in the particulars of executive administration of justice.  The 
legislative power was a defensive, reactive power, and the executive re-
mained the primary source of governmental regulatory activity.  Legisla-
tive delegation was consistent with this view of law and legislative power 
because it was a formal recognition of the principle of legislative suprem-
acy and the fact of executive dominance of governance. 
  
 118. Of course, the accuracy of judicial enforcement of the nondelegation doctrine is unknowable 
because the most prudent separation of legislation and execution is itself unknowable.  But surely the 
aggregate effect of judicial review is to move us generally in the proper direction, since it can’t lead us 
any further in the wrong direction. 
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Once legislative supremacy was established, law slowly came to be 
understood simply as the command of the sovereign legislature; whatever 
passed the legislature was law.  Special interests lost no time in taking ad-
vantage of this fact, and the American experience under state constitutions 
predicated on legislative supremacy caused no shortage of difficulties.  The 
Constitution, then, was designed with these difficulties in mind, and the 
result was limited government.  Among the important aspects of the consti-
tutional structure were the equality of the branches, the weakening of the 
legislature via bicameralism, and the distinctness between the composition 
of the two chambers of Congress.  Legislative delegation is inimical to this 
conception of law and legislative power because it circumvents constitu-
tional features designed to constrain the legislature. 
The debate over delegation ought to focus on the importance of consti-
tutionalism as systematized “meta-rules” constraining law and governmen-
tal action.  Where the debate has focused on constitutionalism, decision-
makers and commentators alike have too quickly accepted necessity justi-
fications of delegation, thereby short-circuiting the constitutional debate.  
But a reexamination of the philosophy of Progressives in particular shows 
that, although necessity rarely failed to appear in their rhetoric, it was as 
much a strident and well-developed ideological argument that truly under-
girded their calls for expanding the scope of government in society.  More-
over, there are strong theoretical reasons and convincing evidence to be-
lieve that delegation allows legislators to separate their personal ambitions 
from the constitutional rights of their office, so that political checks are 
insufficient to maintain the constitutionally designed system of separation 
of powers.  The result is an increased desire among legal commentators to 
resurrect judicial review of delegation. 
Judicial enforcement of the nondelegation doctrine is problematic be-
cause it is perhaps the most difficult area in which to draw lines demarcat-
ing what is and is not allowed.  Nevertheless, resurrecting a categorical 
distinction between core legislative and non-legislative powers may yet be 
a reasonable way to reestablish a nondelegation doctrine consistent with 
the thinking of the Founders.  Conceding its indefiniteness, one can still 
argue that such a formalist doctrine would, on the whole, produce intelligi-
ble limits on delegation without too much harm to the efficacy of govern-
ment and the certainty and justice of the law.  In sum, resurrecting the non-
delegation doctrine in judicially enforced form would likely prove practi-
cable and beneficial to American constitutional law and to American gov-
ernment and society. 
 
